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Abstract 
The context of the 2015 general election suggested that the electoral impact of 
parties’ constituency campaigns could vary as a consequence in particular of the 
relative unpopularity of the Liberal Democrats. Using data from a survey of 
election agents, this paper analyses how the main GB level political parties 
adapted the intensity of their constituency level campaign’s to ensure that to 
varying degrees they produced positive electoral payoffs. It further analyses the 
electoral effects of face-to-face campaigning and e-campaigning at constituency 
level and shows that while e-campaigning has grown in importance, face-to-face 
campaigning continues to deliver stronger electoral benefits. Overall, the 2015 
election illustrated that intense constituency level campaigning continues to be 
electorally beneficial for all the parties, but that this was the election when the 
Conservative Party became genuinely effective in terms of the delivery of 
electoral payoffs. 
 
 
Introduction 
Constituency level campaigning has become crucial to the electoral strategies 
of all the principal parties in Britain, and a significant academic literature has 
demonstrated that if effectively deployed, more intense campaigning at the 
constituency level can deliver electoral payoffs (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart & 
Whiteley, 2004, 2009; Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Whiteley, Clarke, Sanders & 
Stewart, 2013; Johnston, 1987; Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse, 1995; Denver 
& Hands, 1997; Denver, Hands, Fisher & McAllister, 2003; Fieldhouse & 
Cutts, 2009; Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a; Johnston and Pattie, 2014). 
Comparative studies, using a variety of approaches, tend to show similar 
patterns (Gerber & Green, 2000; Karp, Banducci & Bowler, 2007; Hillygus, 
2005; Marsh, 2004, Carty & Eagles, 1999). 
 
Although all elections differ to an extent, the 2015 general election was a 
potentially fascinating one in respect of measuring the impact of campaigns. 
First, unlike previous elections in the post-war era, there was no single 
incumbent – the 2010 general election produced a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government. As a result, any effects of punishment and 
reward would be less clear cut – both where the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats were the principal parties in constituency contests and in places 
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where the anti-Conservative vote was split between the Liberal Democrats 
and other parties. In addition, these circumstances raised the spectre of how 
candidates from parties that had been in coalition in government, would 
compete against each other.  
 
Second, in the period between the 2010 and 2015 elections, UKIP looked to 
be becoming a more significant electoral force. While it fielded 558 candidates 
in the 2010 election, it only averaged 3.5% of the vote in the seats where it 
stood (which still represented a record for a minor party). After 2010, the party 
secured its first two parliamentary seats in by-elections and secured the 
highest share of the vote (27.5%) and largest number of seats in the 2014 
European Elections. It also regularly outpolled the Liberal Democrats after 
early 2013. In 2015, UKIP stood in 624 of the 632 constituencies in Britain. As 
a consequence, the main GB parties were likely to find themselves fighting 
constituencies on more than one front in a number of constituencies – the 
party’s principal opponent together with UKIP. Up to a point, the same was 
true in respect of the Greens, who won a seat in 2010 and stood in 573 seats 
compared with 335 in 2010. However, unlike UKIP, the party did not 
experience the same level of momentum either in terms of opinion poll ratings 
or election successes. 
 
Third, the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland had a clear effect on 
the electoral landscape, there. Although the pro-independence side lost the 
referendum, the positive impact of SNP poll ratings was very significant, thus 
potentially inhibiting the effectiveness of the pro-union parties’ campaigns. 
Again, while the SNP’s strong electoral activity previously focussed on a 
minority of seats (the six the party held being the principal ones), the post 
referendum surge in support meant that the party was a serious electoral 
threat in most, if not all of the 59 seats in Scotland. As a consequence the 
pro-unionist parties found themselves with an additional political foe in many 
more constituencies. 
 
Conditions such as these would suggest that the effects of campaigning may 
not necessarily be consistent over time in respect of the delivery of electoral 
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payoffs. Campaigns do not occur in a vacuum and contextual factors such as 
those described above may have a significant impact on the level of their 
electoral success. Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts (2011a), drawing of analyses of 
the effects of constituency campaigning over the course of five British general 
elections, illustrate that the level of electoral benefits are broadly a function of 
a series of conditions, exogenous to the campaign activity itself. The first is 
the closeness of the election. Campaigning in general will tend to be more 
electorally effective when elections are more marginal. But these effects are 
mediated depending on levels of party popularity. Campaigns will tend to 
deliver more in the way of electoral benefits where parties are not unusually 
popular or unpopular. If parties are unusually unpopular, the impact of 
campaigns will be lessened for unpopular parties (since voters will be less 
receptive) and also possibly for the more popular ones, since the campaign is 
less likely to impact on voters’ decisions. Certainly, research using 
experimental methods has shown that campaign interventions are affected by 
the level of popularity of the party (Niven, 2001; Hillygus, 2005; Arceneaux 
and Nickerson, 2009). 
 
The second condition is the likelihood of change. Where significant change is 
likely as a result of the election, this is likely to enhance the effectiveness of 
challengers’ campaigns and reduce that of incumbents, since there is an 
anticipation of a change of government. The third condition relates to the logic 
of first-past-the post, which incentivises parties to focus attention on target 
seats (both those they are trying to gain and those they are trying to hold). 
Targeting is a function of focussing limited resource, so it matters not only that 
parties target resource but also how many seats constitute targets. Thus, 
under normal conditions, parties that targeted a high number of seats would 
tend to deliver fewer electoral payoffs as resources would be too stretched. 
Conversely, targeting fewer seats should produce greater electoral payoffs. 
However, under circumstances where some parties may be particularly 
unpopular, the impact of targeting larger numbers of seats on the electoral 
payoffs for the more popular parties should be lessened (and therefore more 
beneficial) as despite their resources being more stretched, voters will be less 
receptive to the unpopular parties’ campaigning.  
Page | 4  
 
 
Finally, and related to the third condition, parties campaigns are more 
effective when there is strong central coordination of constituency efforts. 
However, this condition will be mediated by whether the central party has 
clear objectives or not. If parties’ have clear objectives (such as winning a 
small majority or denying another party a majority, rather than just trying to 
win as many seats as possible), the electoral benefits are likely to be greater. 
The exogenous conditions are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Exogenous factors influencing likely effectiveness of constituency campaigns 
   
 More Effective  Less Effective 
Closeness of Election Popularity Equilibrium  Unpopular party(ies) 
Significant change likely Challenger(s)  Incumbent 
High No’s of Target seats Unpopular party(ies)  Popularity Equilibrium 
Central Management Clear objectives  Unclear objectives 
 
 
The Context in 2015 
Closeness of Election 
It is well established that the final opinion polls under-estimated the extent of 
the Conservative lead prior to the 2015 election. However, while that aspect 
was clearly an error, other aspects of the opinion polls were accurate. The 
polls correctly predicted the level of support for the Liberal Democrats and for 
the SNP. Moreover, regardless of the accuracy of the polls in respect of the 
final result, the polls did create an environment around the election where the 
outcome was assumed by most to be close in terms of Labour and the 
Conservatives, thus creating stronger conditions for more effective electoral 
payoffs. As Figure 1 shows, for the Conservative and Labour parties, there 
was popularity equilibrium – neither was especially unpopular (nor indeed, 
especially popular) – suggesting better conditions for both parties’ effective 
campaigns.  
 
For the Liberal Democrats, however, the story of much of the electoral cycle 
was one of unpopularity. From soon after the 2010 election, Liberal Democrat 
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poll ratings fell dramatically and never recovered, the party even falling behind 
UKIP after early 2013. Under these conditions, the effectiveness of Liberal 
Democrat campaigning was likely to be diminished. UKIP, on the other hand, 
grew markedly in popularity after 2012, and following the party’s success in 
the 2014 European elections, enjoyed conditions that could improve the 
electoral effectiveness of its campaigns and potentially diminish those of the 
parties against which it was standing. 
 
The Likelihood of Significant Change 
The nature of the Coalition, together with the opinion polls (see Figure 1) 
suggested that significant change was simultaneously both likely and unlikely. 
Thus, poll ratings could have suggested a Conservative minority (seen as the 
most likely outcome by 45% of electors1), with the Liberal Democrats 
continuing to offer support either formally in a coalition or more informally 
(Significant Change Unlikely); or they could have suggested in a Labour 
minority (seen as the most likely outcome by 25% of electors), with the Liberal 
Democrats offering support, again either formally or informally (Significant 
Change More Likely). Or finally, they could have suggested a Labour minority 
with support coming from the SNP (Significant Change Likely). No poll ratings 
indicated a Conservative majority (though 11% of voters thought it the most 
likely outcome), or indeed, a Labour one (6% of voters seeing that outcome 
as being likely). Under these conditions, the Conservatives, Labour and 
indeed the Liberal Democrats and SNP could have benefited, suggesting that 
this condition was not especially significant in 2015.  
 
That said, one potential outcome (a Labour minority supported by the SNP) 
had the potential to help Conservative campaigns, such was the apparent 
opposition to this outcome.  A YouGov poll in late-April 2015 suggested that 
61% of voters viewed a Labour-SNP government as being bad for the UK, 
compared with 54% saying the same of a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
Government – not an overwhelming difference, but significant when compared 
with the 49% who thought that Labour governing alone would be bad for the 
                                                 
1
  All references to voter election outcome expectations are derived from an Ipsos-MORI poll in April 2015. 
https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2565/Expected-general-election-
outcome-19792005.aspx. Accessed 11/8/15 
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UK.2 Were these circumstances to be borne out, our model would require 
revision. In other words, some forms of significant change may be more 
important than others, and in cases such as a potential Labour-SNP 
partnership, could damage the challenger rather than the incumbent. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
High Numbers of Target Seats 
In previous elections, one of the factors influencing the electoral success of 
constituency campaigns has not only been the ability to target resources, but 
also the numbers of seats targeted. In 2001, for example, both Labour and the 
Conservatives targeted very high numbers of seats, which would tend to lead 
to campaigns being less effective, with finite resources being too stretched 
                                                 
2
  You Gov. Fieldwork 21-22nd April 2015. See: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/04/24/ranking-coalitions/ 
 
Page | 7  
 
(Denver et al, 2002). Similarly, the Liberal Democrats arguably targeted too 
many seats in 2010 (Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a). The 2001 example is 
a strong one, as it shows that the impact of targeting large numbers can be 
mediated by party popularity – Labour’s campaigning was more effective than 
expected as the Conservatives were unpopular at the time. In 2015, none of 
the main GB parties targeted an excessive number. The Conservatives 
initially pursued a 40/40 strategy, targeting 40 gains and 40 holds. Initially 
announced in 2012, the basis of selection was not only electoral status, but 
also seat demographics, the state of the local party’s organisation and levels 
of local activity. This list was reviewed at the beginning of 2014 and a series 
of additional offensive targets held by the Liberal Democrats was added.  
 
Labour initially announced a list of 86 target seats in January 2013, with 
various scenarios designed to deliver a Labour majority of 20, 30 or 40. The 
party decided to publish the list of seats. However, the list was deemed to be 
insufficiently ‘one nation’ and so a further 20 seats were added in the South 
and in the Midlands, even though the party thought these additional seats to 
be unwinnable. In reality, the party came to the view that only 61 were 
potentially winnable, and within those 61, there were clear categories of likely 
success. 32 were deemed much more likely with a further 23 were identified 
as very significant battleground seats. A further 6 seats were tough targets. In 
addition, a few seats that Labour held were identified as being ones that 
would warrant target status. 
 
Soon after the 2010 election, the Liberal Democrats identified around 70 
targets consisting both of some seats that party already held and some 
‘offensive seats’ – ones the party thought it could gain. The basis of selection 
was both electoral status and also local party performance. But, as Liberal 
Democrat electoral performance started to decline, the list was progressively 
reviewed with fewer seats remaining as targets. A critical point was reached in 
the summer on 2014 following another bad set of election results in both local 
and European elections, and throughout the final year of the Parliament, the 
list of targets was progressively cut, reflecting both the results of internal 
polling and the level of activity in local parties. By January 2015, the number 
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of Liberal Democrat targets was ‘considerably down’ on the figure with which 
the party had begun the electoral cycle. For all three GB parties, then, the 
high numbers of targets seats seen in previous elections did not apply, 
suggesting conditions more conducive to constituency campaigns delivering 
electoral payoffs.  
 
Central Management 
In the case of all three GB parties, there was, as in previous elections, a 
strong level of central direction of constituency level campaigns, which tends 
to produce positive electoral benefits (Fisher, Denver & Hands, 2006). 
However, the 2010 election showed clearly that central management only 
achieves so much – what is also required is for the central party to have clear 
objectives. In 2010, the effectiveness of the Liberal Democrat’s campaigns 
was lessened as a result of the party’s strategy being simultaneously too 
offensive and too defensively minded. Conversely, Labour’s central 
management objectives were clear – to deny the Conservatives a majority – 
and this clear strategy yielded payoffs (Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2011). As 
is clear from the discussion in respect of target seats, all three main GB 
parties had clear strategies: the Conservatives’ 40/40 strategy was designed 
to deliver a modest majority and was only enhanced when it became clear 
that the Liberal Democrats were very vulnerable. Labour had on paper a 
slightly less clear strategy, publically targeting around 20 seats that were 
unwinnable. In reality, however, the parties’ focus was on rather fewer; again, 
with the prospect of securing a modest majority. The Liberal Democrat’s 
strategy also became increasingly clear over the cycle, the party moving from 
a position of trying to gain seats to being clear that they could only hold a 
fraction of those the party had won in 2010. Under these conditions, we would 
expect the central management of each party to enhance the level of electoral 
payoffs as a result of their campaigning. 
 
In sum, then, the exogenous factors pointed to the likely effectiveness of 
Conservative and Labour campaigns. The contest was deemed to be close 
and neither party was especially unpopular. In terms of significant change, 
only one circumstance suggested the potential to lessen the impact of 
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campaigns – a Labour-SNP partnership in government. All other 
circumstances did not appear to so relevant in terms of the impact on 
campaigns in 2015. In terms of targeting, both parties appeared to be 
focussing on a manageable number of seats, though the Labour target list 
was unusually high. And in terms of central management objectives, a modest 
majority was sought by both. For the Liberal Democrats, the picture was less 
clear. Clearly, the party’s unpopularity was likely to lessen its campaign 
effectiveness, even in a tight contest. On the other hand, the party had an 
evolving target seats strategy reflecting this and the central management 
indicated that the effects of unpopularity might be offset but the party’s 
retrenchment in terms of the seats it could reasonably expect to hold. We test 
these propositions in the next section of the paper. 
 
The Intensity of the Constituency Campaigns 
The first step to evaluating the parties’ success in respect of their constituency 
level campaigns is to create a measurable index of campaign intensity. We do 
this by using data from a survey of the election agents of Conservative, 
Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid Cymru and UKIP candidates who stood 
for 629 of the 632 constituencies in Great Britain – a total of 2,5923. The data 
reported here are based on 1,120 valid responses received as of August 7th 
2015. These comprise of 229 Conservative, 327 Labour, 316 Liberal 
Democrat, 28 SNP, 21 Plaid Cymru and 199 UKIP agents. 
 
Questions from the survey are used to created additive scales for the core 
components of a constituency campaign for all of the six surveyed parties: 
preparation, organisation, manpower, use of computers, use of telephones, 
polling day activity, use of direct mail, level of doorstep canvassing, leafleting, 
and electronic campaigning (see, for example, Denver & Hands, 1997 and 
Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a). In this paper, the scale consists of the 
same components as for the 2010 study (see Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 
2011a) except for the fact that e-campaigning component features additional 
variables reflecting new developments in that area. The intensity index is 
                                                 
3
  No questionnaires were sent to agents in Buckingham (the Speaker’s seat), or to Rochdale and Heywood 
& Middleton. In the case of the latter two constituencies, the local authority (Rochdale) did not publish 
details of the agents. No electoral agent address details were available for 18 UKIP agents. This was 
principally the case where the agents were also Parliamentary candidates. 
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calculated using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of all these core 
indicators of constituency campaigning.4 Using conventional cut-off criteria, 
the PCAs suggest one factor is sufficient to represent the variance in the 
original variables in the index (details of which are shown in the Appendix). 
The PCA produces factor scores which are then standardised around a mean 
of 100. This process allows easy comparisons between parties as well as the 
electoral status of seats.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the mean level of campaign intensity for all six parties. Of 
the GB parties, as would be expected, the Conservatives and Labour ran the 
strongest campaigns overall, though unlike previous elections, the overall 
intensity of Labour campaigns was slightly higher. As usual, the Liberal 
Democrats ran, on average, less intensive campaigns, while UKIP ran, on 
average, weaker ones still. This would be expected given UKIP’s relatively 
recent development as a political party. In the case of the national parties, 
Plaid Cymru campaigns were stronger on average than those of the Liberal 
Democrats, though of course, the party was only standing in 40 seats. Most 
noteworthy, however, is the strength of the SNP campaigns, which on 
average were the most intense of all the parties, and significantly more 
intense than the main two GB parties. This may be expected up to a point 
given the limited number of seats fought by the SNP (59) compared with the 
GB parties. Nonetheless, the high score reflects both the strength of the SNP 
as a party in 2015 and the fact that it actively targeted around 42 of the 59 
seats in Scotland. 
 
Table 2. Overall Campaign Intensity Scores 
 
 Con Lab Lib Dem SNP PC UKIP 
Score 113 116 86 137 98 76 
 
In order to corroborate these findings, we examine individual level data from 
Wave 6 of the British Election Study. Table 3 summarises whether the parties 
contacted an individual elector over the last four weeks of the campaign and 
                                                 
4
 Where there were missing data on individual variables that formed part of these scales, multiple imputation 
was used, which took account of the individual party and the electoral status of the seat. 
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in how many ways (Telephone, Letter/Leaflet, Home visit, Contact in the 
street, Email, Text message, Other). Of course, some of these contacts could 
include central party campaigning efforts, but the rank order in terms of 
campaign intensity illustrated in Table 2 is replicated in terms of both the 
proportions contacted and the number of contacts. Some 53% of Scottish 
electors were contacted by the SNP and of the GB parties, contact rates were 
also fairly impressive, Labour contacting 43% of electors and even UKIP 
managing 22%. The average number of contacts was a little less impressive, 
but again, the SNP, Labour and the Conservatives made most contacts on 
average. 
 
Table 3. Individual Level Contacts over Last Four Weeks of Campaign 
 
 Con Lab Lib 
Dem 
SNP PC UKIP 
% Contacted 38 43 25 53 28 22 
Mean No. of Contacts (Max 7) 1.43 1.51 1.30 1.77 1.31 1.13 
Source: British Election Study Wave 6: n=30,013 (GB), 2,651 (Scotland), 1,556 (Wales) 
 
Of course, what matters more in terms of campaigning is less the overall level 
of intensity and more the effectiveness of targeting these resources on the 
seats in which parties are trying to gain or hold. Generally speaking, we would 
expect a party to run its most intense campaigns in the most marginal seats it 
was seeking to gain or hold, and its next most intense campaigns in the seats 
that it held, but where there was much less chance of losing the seat – so-
called ‘safe seats’. This is because resources in such seats tend to be 
greater, both in terms of membership and often wealth (Fisher, 2000; Fisher 
Denver & Hands, 2006). All parties may seek to divert resources to the most 
key battleground seats, but resources such as people are often less readily 
mobile (Fisher & Denver, 2009). Finally, we would expect parties to run their 
least intense campaigns in those seats where it has little chance of winning. 
As Karp et al (2007: 92) suggest from comparative analyses: ‘parties will 
expend greater effort on mobilizing voters when the expected benefits of 
turning out voters are greatest, relative to cost.’ 
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We assess this in Table 4, which disaggregates the mean campaign intensity 
of the three main GB parties by the electoral status of the seat relative to that 
party. There are four categories: Ultra Marginal, where the majority after 2010 
was less than 5%; Marginal, where the majority was between 5% and 10%; 
Held, where a party held the seats with a majority of more than 10% - so-
called ‘safe seats’; and Not Held, where a party did not hold a seat and is 
more than 10% behind the winning party – so-called ‘hopeless’ seats. For the 
Conservatives and Labour, the distribution is exactly as predicted – the most 
intense campaigns took place in the most marginal seats, and campaigns in 
safe seats were much more intense than in hopeless ones. Not only that, 
Conservative and Labour campaigning was pretty evenly matched in ultra-
marginals and safe seats, while Labour’s was more intense in marginals (5-
10% majority). All of this suggests strong party management and clear 
objectives, except in the case of Labour’s hopeless seats, where campaigning 
was surprisingly intense, though still much less intense than the other 
categories of seat. Of course, strong campaigns in hopeless seats do not 
damage a party’s electoral prospects, but they do suggest that resource could 
have been transferred to make campaigns in the more marginal seats 
stronger still.  
 
More noteworthy is the distribution of Liberal Democrat campaign effort. As 
predicted, campaigns in ultra-marginals were more intense than in marginals 
and least intense in hopeless seats. However, the Liberal Democrats’ 
strongest campaigns were, on average, in the parties’ safe seats, nearly 
matching the intensity of Conservative and Labour seats in their ultra-
marginals. Under conditions of popularity equilibrium this would be a curious 
finding. But, as we know, the Liberal Democrats were especially unpopular in 
the years preceding the 2015 election and the party acknowledged this by 
progressively reducing its number of target seats. Set against that backdrop, 
the very defensive nature of Liberal Democrat campaigning demonstrated by 
the high level of intensity in its safer seats appears to represent good 
resource management by a party with clear objectives – to try and retain as 
many of its safer seats as is feasible by focussing resources on these and 
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effectively ‘sacrificing’ those seats where the party was likely to lose by re-
directing resource.  
 
This is reminiscent of Labour’s management of its 2010 campaign. The party 
knew it would lose its majority and largest party status and focussed instead 
on seeking to deny the Conservatives a majority by effectively running 
stronger campaigns in less marginal seats – a strategy that was effective 
(Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011a). In some ways, then, the puzzle may be 
less why the intensity was so high in Liberal Democrat safe seats and more 
why it was not lower in the party’s ultra-marginals. The relatively high scores 
here suggest some lack of clarity in the party’s objectives, or at least an 
inability to divert more resources from ultra-marginals to the nominally safer 
seats. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Campaign Intensity by Electoral Status 
 
 
Ultra Marginal 
<5% 
Marginal  
5-10% 
Held  
10%+ 
Not Held  
10%+ 
Con 148 133 126 84 
Lab 146 141 128 100 
Lib Dem 130 125 144 77 
 
The Ns for each category are as follows: Conservative - Ultra-Marginal (17), Marginal (29), Held (98), 
Not Held (85); Labour - Ultra-Marginal (33), Marginal (38), Held (75), Not Held (181); Liberal Democrats 
- Ultra-Marginal (15), Marginal (20), Held (18), Not Held (263) 
 
 
Four Million Conversations 
In January 2015, then Labour leader Ed Miliband declared that Labour would 
seek to have four million face-to face conversations with voters in advance of 
the elections, no doubt reflecting the evidence in a path-breaking article 
showing how the efforts of volunteer labour could offset those of candidate 
spending (Fisher et al, 2014). There is certainly empirical support for such a 
strategy and we assess here where Labour was more successful in this 
respect than other parties. We do this in two ways. First we use a scale of 
items capturing face-to face contact from our survey of electoral agents. As 
with the index of overall campaign intensity, scores are standardised around a 
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mean of 100.5 We then utilise the British Election Study Wave 6 to establish 
the proportion of voters contacted in person (at home or in the street) and the 
mean number of personal contacts. As a comparison, we create similar 
measures for E-Campaigning. The 2010 election campaign was regularly 
described as an important one in terms of e-campaigning, though empirical 
testing indicated that it was actually far less significant (Fisher, Fieldhouse & 
Cutts, 2011b). Since 2010 there have been further developments in social 
media and so we create a scale of E-Campaigning in the same way, 
standardised around a mean of 100.6 We also utilize Wave 6 of the British 
Election Study to establish the proportion of voters contacted by email or text 
message and the mean number of e-contacts. The results are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5 shows that of the GB parties, Labour did indeed have the most 
intense face-to-face activity, though the difference between theirs and that of 
the Conservatives is not huge. However, it was the SNP that on average had 
the highest level of face-to-face contact. These findings are corroborated by 
those from individual level data in Table 6. Labour contacted 11% of electors 
face-to face (compared with the Conservatives’ 8%) and the mean number of 
face-to-face contacts was similarly higher. Once again, however, the SNP’s 
contact rate was higher (an impressive 21% of electors in Scotland). 
Notwithstanding, the 11% contact rate by Labour suggest that the four million 
conversations did take place (in fact, the figure equates to nearly five million).  
 
The level of e-campaigning varied a little more. Once again, the 
Conservatives and Labour had the most intense of the GB parties, and again, 
the SNP had the most intense overall. Of note, here, is the level of UKIP e-
campaign intensity, which, while below average was nevertheless higher than 
that of the Liberal Democrats (Table 5). However, when we look at the 
individual level data in Table 6, the differentiation between the three main GB 
parties and the SNP is much less marked. Although the SNP had the highest 
mean number of contacts, they were nowhere as numerous as face-to-face 
                                                 
5
  Details of the variables used and the PCA solution are shown in the Appendix 
6
  Details of the variables used and the PCA solution are shown in the Appendix 
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contacts. This may be a function of at least two factors. First, it is likely that 
parties still regard face-to-face contacts as the best means to reaching out to 
voters. Second, there may be an issue with voter recall: being more likely to 
remember personal contact than e-contact. Certainly the proportion of 
electors recalling a UKIP e-contact compared with the intensity of UKIP e-
campaigning may suggest this. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Face-to-Face and E-Campaigning 
 
 Con Lab Lib Dem SNP PC UKIP 
Face-to-Face 113 118 85 137 106 74 
E-Campaigning 109 107 88 120 94 95 
 
Table 6. Individual Level Personal Contact and E-Contact over Last Four Weeks of Campaign 
 
 Con Lab Lib 
Dem 
SNP PC UKIP 
% Personal Contacted 8 11 4 21 5 2 
Mean Personal (Max 2) .21 .30 .15 .48 .22 .09 
% E-Contacted 9 9 4 11 3 1 
Mean E-Contact (Max 2) .25 .23 .17 .26 .19 .07 
n 30,013 30,013 30,013 2,651 1,556 30,013 
Source: British Election Study Wave 6 
 
However, just as overall campaign effort should be disaggregated by the 
electoral status of the seat, so should face-to face and e-campaigning. We do 
this in Table 7 using the same electoral status categories used in Table 4. In 
terms of face-to-face campaigning, both Labour and the Conservatives 
distributed resources as we might predict. Face-to-face campaigning was 
most intense in the parties’ most marginal seats, and least intense in their 
hopeless seats, safe seats falling in between as predicted. Labour’s level of 
face-to face campaign intensity in its most marginal seats was particularly 
strong. But once again, there was a surprisingly high level of activity in the 
party’s hopeless seats, again suggesting that resource could have been more 
efficiently distributed. For the Liberal Democrats, there is further evidence of 
the party’s defensive campaign strategy, with face-to-face contacts being 
most intense in the party’s safest seats.  
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With e-campaigning, we find similar patterns, with the Conservative level of e-
campaigning in its most marginal seats being impressively high and clearly 
differentiated across the different electoral categories. The differences 
between the categories of seats were less marked for Labour. Once again, we 
see the most intense Liberal Democrat campaigning in the party’s safest 
seats, but a higher level than Labour’s in the party’s most marginal ones, 
suggesting a misplacement of effort – in this case, effort that is more easily 
moved between seats than in the case of human participants. All in all, while 
e-campaigning was certainly more important in 2015 than in 2010 (Fisher, 
2015), the evidence here would suggest that all parties were of the view that 
face-to-face campaigning was still more effective, a proposition we test in the 
next part of this paper. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of Face-to-Face and E-Campaigning by Electoral Status 
 
 
Ultra 
Marg. 
<5% 
Marg.  
5-10% 
Held  
10%+ 
Not 
Held  
10%+ 
Ultra 
Marg. 
<5% 
Marg. 
5-10% 
Held  
10%+ 
Not 
Held  
10%+ 
 Face-to-Face E-Campaigning 
Con 145 133 122 89 143 121 113 94 
Lab 150 141 133 101 120 117 104 104 
Lib Dem 117 119 135 77 125 116 134 80 
 
The Electoral Impact 
We turn finally to the electoral impact of each of the parties’ campaigns. This 
is estimated using ordinary least squares regression (OLS), with share of the 
electorate in 2015 as the dependent variable. Share of the electorate is a 
better indicator of campaign effects than share of the vote, since it captures 
both vote share and capacity to mobilize the electorate to turn out. The model 
we employ is straightforward. Each party’s share of the electorate in 2015 is 
regressed on the campaign intensity index, controlling for the share of the 
electorate in 2010 and personal incumbency (Tables, 8, 9 and 10).  The use 
of the share of the electorate in 2010 as a control makes the model a dynamic 
test and also ensures that other variables that are correlated with previous 
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vote, such as demographics, are effectively controlled. In addition, previous 
electorate share will also capture previous campaign efforts. Thus, insofar as 
campaign efforts are correlated over time, the true extent of campaign effects 
may actually be under-estimated. The test is a stiff one – not surprisingly, 
previous share of the electorate captures a great deal of the variance, so the 
model provides a robust test of whether or not constituency campaigning 
made a positive and significant contribution to electoral performance. 
 
The results are very clear: for all three GB parties, constituency campaigning 
yielded electoral payoffs. Even when controlling for previous share of the 
electorate and the often very significant effects of personal incumbency, more 
intense constituency campaigns delivered positive electoral benefits for the 
respective parties. For ease of interpretation and to illustrate the practical 
significance and substantive impact of the findings, we report the partial or 
marginal effects.7 For example, the model suggests that a Conservative 
candidate (non-incumbent) whose campaign reached the average intensity of 
a Conservative marginal8 seat (139) could expect to win 25.42% of the 
electorate compared to a similar candidate with a campaign intensity of a 
hopeless (Not Held) seat (84) who would win 23.85% of the electorate. The 
difference of around 1.6% suggests a fairly solid increase in support for 
Conservative candidates where they ran an intensive local campaign. The 
corresponding figures for Labour are 19.71% (campaign intensity 144) and 
17.62% (campaign intensity 100) which is a difference of just over 2%, while 
the difference for the Liberal Democrats is around 1.7%.  
 
In the case of the Liberal Democrats, the party targeted markedly fewer seats 
on account of the party’s poor electoral position and expended most effort and 
resources in its safest seats. So if there is a significant campaign boost for the 
Liberal Democrats, we would most likely find it in those seats the party was 
                                                 
7
  A marginal effect generally measures the effect on the conditional mean of y of a change in one of the 
regressors. In OLS regression models, as we run here, the marginal effect equals the relevant slope 
coefficient. To calculate the marginal effects we fix the incumbency value at 1 or 0 (where we compare 
incumbency status) and the party campaign intensity index at the mean value by electoral status (for 
example Labour mean campaign intensity in those seats where the margin was 10% or less) and with all 
other variables at their mean values.  
8
  For the purposes of these illustrations, for all parties we combine the two categories of marginal seats: 
ultra-marginal and marginal 
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trying to hold. This is largely borne out by our findings. Our model suggests a 
difference of 2.3% of the electorate where a candidate reached an average 
campaign intensity of a Liberal Democrat held seat (144) compared to a 
similar candidate where the average campaign intensity mirrored that found in 
hopeless (Not Held) seats (77). With the Liberal Democrats focusing 
resources principally in those safest seats it felt it could realistically hold, the 
results suggest that local campaign intensity did provide a boost in support. 
However, given the scale of the party’s electoral collapse it wasn’t enough to 
save the majority of Liberal Democrat seats, albeit the party may have lost 
further seats (such as Southport and Carshalton and Wallington) without this 
campaign boost.  
 
Table 8. The Electoral Impact of Conservative Constituency Campaigning 
 
Dependent Variable: Share of the Electorate 2015 b Std. Error Sig. 
Constant -2.472 (.547) ** 
Share of the Electorate 2010 .972 (.019) ** 
Personal Incumbent 1.554 (.432) ** 
Campaign Intensity .029 (.005) ** 
Adj. R2 
  .971 
n 
  229 
 
Table 9. The Electoral Impact of Labour Constituency Campaigning 
 
Dependent Variable: Share of the Electorate 2015 b Std. Error Sig. 
Constant .205 (.892) n.s. 
Share of the Electorate 2010 .705 (.040) ** 
Personal Incumbent 3.673 (.677) ** 
Campaign Intensity .047 (.009) ** 
Adj. R2 
  .828 
n 
  327 
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Table 10. The Electoral Impact of Liberal Democrat Constituency Campaigning 
 
Dependent Variable: Share of the Electorate 2015 b Std. Error Sig. 
Constant -3.902 (.388) ** 
Share of the Electorate 2010 .365 (.023) ** 
Personal Incumbent 9.513 (.514) ** 
Campaign Intensity .034 (.006) ** 
Adj. R2 
  .895 
n 
  316 
 
However, for all three parties, the ‘elephant in the room’ was Scotland, where 
of course, the electoral conditions were very different on account of the 
spectacular rise of the SNP. We therefore re-run the models, confining our 
analyses to England and Wales only (Table 11). Again, the campaigns of all 
three parties delivered electoral payoffs. And, by computing the marginal 
effects in the same way as above, we find the estimated advantage in terms 
of share of the electorate to be 1.7% for the Conservatives, 1.3% for Labour 
and 1.3% for the Liberal Democrats. For both Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, the local campaign boost was marginally stronger in Great Britain 
overall than in England and Wales alone, actually suggesting some additional 
positive impact of those campaigns in Scotland. However, welcome though 
those benefits were, they were nowhere nearly enough to stem the SNP tide.   
 
Table 11. The Electoral Impact of Constituency Campaigning (England and Wales Only). 
 
 
Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats 
 
b Std.  
Error 
Sig. b Std.  
Error 
Sig. b Std.  
Error 
Sig. 
Constant -2.699 (.608) ** .387 (.642) n.s. -3.910 (.336) ** 
Share of the Elect. 2010 .970 (.021) ** .853 (.030) ** .402 (.021) ** 
Personal Incumbent 1.438 (.440) ** 3.256 (.497) ** 8.631 (.466) ** 
Campaign Intensity .032 (.006) ** .031 (.007) ** .026 (.005) ** 
Adj. R2 
  .966   .917   .915 
n 
  206   304   289 
Dependent Variable: Share of the Electorate 2015 
 
We turn finally to comparing the effects of face-to-face and e-campaigning. To 
begin with, we test the impact of these approaches using the same model as 
for overall impact, but substituting the scale of face-to-face campaigning for 
the overall index of campaign intensity and then doing the same for e-
campaigning. In isolation, both aspects deliver positive electoral payoffs for all 
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three GB parties (though in the case of Labour, the effects of e-campaigning 
are on the cusp of statistical significance). However, a better test is to run the 
model with both indexes included and compare the relative effects. The 
results are shown in Table 12.9  
 
What is clear for all parties is that face-to-face campaigning delivers positive 
electoral benefits. And, for the Liberal Democrats, so does e-campaigning 
albeit at a lower level (the difference being statistically significant). However, 
in the case of both the Conservative and Labour parties, when both indexes 
are included in the model, only face-to-face campaigning continues to deliver 
positive benefits. In other words, e-campaigning has become more important, 
but the effects of the human touch are still significantly greater. 
 
Table 12. The Electoral Impact of Face-to-Face and E-Campaigning 
 
 
Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats 
 
b Std.  
Error 
Sig. b Std.  
Error 
Sig. b Std.  
Error 
Sig. 
Constant -2.585 (.621) ** .632 (1.011) n.s. -4.205 (.416) ** 
Share of the Elect. 2010 .982 (.019) ** .721 (.698) ** .370 (.022) ** 
Personal Incumbent 1.696 (.436) ** 3.538 (.685) ** 9.692 (.506) ** 
Face-to-Face .021 (.006) ** .040 (.010) ** .026 (.006) ** 
E-Campaigning .005 (.005) n.s. .001 (.008) n.s. .010 (.004) * 
Adj. R2 
  .970   .824   .895 
n 
  229   327   316 
Dependent Variable: Share of the Electorate 2015 
 
Conclusions 
These preliminary analyses suggest a number of things. First, it is absolutely 
clear that constituency campaigns matter to the parties and impact upon 
electoral outcomes. It is very apparent that both a great deal of effort was 
made in terms of campaigning at the constituency level and that parties also 
were acutely aware that effective targeting was the best strategy for delivering 
electoral payoffs. Secondly, it’s very clear that face-face-face campaigning is 
regarded by parties as being of particular importance. Regardless of 
technological developments, the human touch still matters and seemingly has 
more impact on voters.  
 
                                                 
9
  When including both indexes, we ran full tests to detect any multi-collinearity. There was no evidence of 
these for any of the three parties 
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Third, however, while 2010 was a damp squib in respect of e-campaigning, 
the evidence thus far from 2015 is that it has become a more significant 
component of parties’ constituency efforts. The Conservatives in particular 
made extensive use of e-campaigning in ultra-marginal seats, on a par with 
their level of face-to–face effort, while the Liberal Democrats did the same in 
their area of principal focus – the parties’ hitherto safe seats. And, there is 
some evidence of positive electoral effects of e-campaigning, though for all 
three main GB parties, the effects of face-to-face campaigning are stronger.  
 
Fourth, it’s clear that more intense constituency campaigning continues to 
deliver electoral payoffs. What is notable for this election, however, is that the 
Conservatives appear to have caught up with Labour. Hitherto, the electoral 
impact of Conservative campaigning varied in large part because the party 
struggled to target resources effectively. The evidence from 2015 is that that 
lesson has been well and truly learned. In short, 2015 was the election when 
the Conservatives appeared to have cracked the effective management and 
operation of constituency level campaigning. 
 
So how do these results fit our model for understanding the likely impact of 
campaigns? In terms of the closeness of the election, the popularity 
equilibrium in respect of the Conservatives and Labour helped their 
campaigns to be more effective. For the Liberal Democrats, the apparent 
success of the party’s campaigns would appear to run counter to this 
particular condition in isolation.  
 
In respect of the likelihood of significant change, our initial analysis suggested 
that this condition would be unlikely to affect the three GB parties to any great 
extent, unless opposition to a Labour-SNP government was paramount in 
voters’ thoughts. Such a circumstance should have enhanced the 
effectiveness of the Conservative campaigns and damaged those of Labour 
(running counter to our model’s prediction in respect of the impact on 
challengers and incumbents). Yet while Conservative campaigning was 
effective, so was Labour’s. Given the very effective targeting by the 
Conservatives in this election, it seems probable that the notion of significant 
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change did not impact significantly on the electoral effects of the constituency 
campaigns. That said, the estimated impact of Labour’s campaigns in 
England and Wales was lower than in Great Britain as a whole, which may 
indicate a negative effect in respect of voter fears of a Labour-SNP 
government at Westminster. Equally, however, the Liberal Democrats 
similarly experienced a stronger estimated campaign impact in Great Britain 
as a whole compared with just England and Wales.  
 
Thirdly, the results of the 2010 election which meant that the Conservatives 
and Labour needed to target more modest numbers to secure a small 
majority, coupled with the Liberal Democrats reducing their numbers of 
targets on account of the party’s declining popularity meant that excessive 
numbers of target seats were not a key negative influence on the impact of 
campaigns, thereby suggesting conditions conducive to delivering electoral 
impact, which indeed occurred. Fourthly, and most critically, it was quite clear 
that all three GB parties had clear central objectives in the campaign, thereby 
enhancing the electoral effectiveness of their efforts. This is most clearly 
illustrated in the case of the Liberal Democrats, who in the face of a series of 
poor election results and poll ratings ran a very defensive campaign, with 
more activity taking place in the parties’ hitherto safe seats. In effect, the 
parties’ clear central management objectives helped offset the lack of 
equilibrium in the parties’ popularity. 
 
In sum, 2015 was the election when Conservative constituency campaigns 
‘clicked’. But, Labour and Liberal Democrat campaigns also delivered positive 
electoral gains, suggesting, if nothing else, that the results could have been 
even worse for those two parties had their campaigns not been so well-
managed. Of course, while the Labour and Liberal Democrat campaigns 
delivered improvements in vote share, the improvements were insufficiently 
large to win more seats. Campaigning alone will not do that – it is contingent 
on contextual factors. 
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Appendix 
Calculation of Campaign Intensity Index 
Responses to the questions below are grouped through additive scales into the 
following core components of constituency campaigning: Preparation, Organisation, 
Manpower, Computers, Polling Day Activity, Telephones, Direct Mail, Canvassing, 
Leaflets and E-Campaigning. These groups are then entered into a PCA, which 
produced the solution overleaf.  
Group Question 
 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - JOBS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - CAMPAIGN FUNDS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - MAIN COMMITTEE ROOMS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - LOCAL COMMITTEE ROOMS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - ELECTORAL REGISTER 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - ELECTION ADDRESS 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - PRINTING 
Preparation HOW PREPARED - IDENTIFYING SUPPORTERS 
Preparation STARTED SERIOUS PLANNING 
Preparation USE OF PREVIOUS CANVASS RECORDS 
Organization % OF CONST COVERED BY ACTIVE LOCAL ORGS 
Organization HOW LONG AGO KNEW RESPONSIBLE 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - CANVASSING ORGANISER 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - POSTAL VOTES 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - CANDIDATE AIDE 
Organization DELEGATED DUTIES - COMPUTER OFFICER 
Organization LOCAL ORGAINSERS OR SUB-AGENTS 
Manpower NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN WORKERS 
Manpower NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY 
Computers DELEGATED DUTIES - COMPUTER OFFICER 
Computers USE OF COMPUTERS - DIRECT MAIL 
Computers USE OF COMPUTERS - CANVASS RETURNS 
Computers USE COMPUTERISED ELECTORAL REGISTER 
Computers COMPUTERS USED TO COMPILE KNOCK-UP LISTS 
Computers ELECTION SOFTWARE PROVIDED BY PARTY HQ 
Polling Day Activity GOOD MORNING LEAFLETS DELIVERED 
Polling Day Activity VOTERS KNOCKED UP ON POLLING DAY 
Polling Day Activity % OF CONSTITUENCY COVERED 
Polling Day Activity NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY 
Polling Day Activity VOLUNTEERS SENT INTO YOUR CONSTITUENCY 
Telephones USE TELEPHONE CANVASSING IN CONSTITUENCY 
Telephones OUTSIDE CANVASSING 
Telephones USE TELEPHONE CANVASSING 
Telephones TELEPHONE CANVASSING ORGANISED FROM OUTSIDE 
CONSTITUENCY 
Telephones VOTERS CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE ON POLLING DAY 
Direct Mail LEAFLETS TARGETED AT PARTICULAR GROUPS 
Direct Mail DIRECT MAIL USED TO TARGET INDIVIDUAL VOTERS 
Canvassing % OF ELECTORATE CANVASSED 
Canvassing % OF ELECTORATE TELEPHONE CANVASSED? 
Leaflets HOW MANY REGIONALLY/NATIONALLY PRODUCED LEAFLETS 
DISTRIBUTED 
Leaflets TOTAL NUMBER OF LOCALLY PRODUCED LEAFLETS 
E-Campaigning PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - OPERATING AND MAINTAINING A 
WEBSITE 
E-Campaigning PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - USING SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
E-Campaigning CONTACT VOTERS IN THE CONSTITUENCY BY TEXT MESSAGE 
E-Campaigning MAKE USE OF TWITTER TO COMMUNICATE WITH VOTERS 
E-Campaigning USE OF COMPUTERS - EMAILING VOTERS 
E-Campaigning LOCAL PARTY & CANDIDATE WEBSITE 
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - MAINTAINING WEBSITE 
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - EMAILING VOTERS 
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES  
E-Campaigning CAMPAIGN EFFORT - VIDEO/IMAGE SHARING SITES  
E-Campaigning VOTERS CONTACTED BY TEXT ON POLLING DAY 
E-Campaigning VOTERS CONTACTED BY EMAIL ON POLLING DAY 
E-Campaigning CANDIDATE HAD CAMAPIGN TWITTER ACCOUNT 
E-Campaigning CANDIDATE HAD CAMAPIGN FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 
E-Campaigning PAID ADVERTS TAKEN OUT ON FACEBOOK AND/OR TWITTER 
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Principal Components Analysis of Campaign Components 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PREPARATION .844 
ORGANISATION .795 
MANPOWER .660 
COMPUTERS .798 
CANVASSING .732 
LEAFLETS .532 
POLLINGDAY .865 
TELEPHONE .559 
ECAMPAIGNING .614 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
Calculation of the Face-to-Face Index 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PRE-ELECTION DOORSTEP CANVASSING .821 
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - STREET STALLS .301 
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - RESIDENT SURVEYS .652 
% OF ELECTORATE CANVASSED .753 
NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN WORKERS .466 
CAMPAIGN EFFORT - CANVASSING TO IDENTIFY SUPPORTERS .892 
CAMPAIGN EFFORT - CANVASSING TO INTRODUCE CANDIDATE .766 
VOTERS KNOCKED UP ON POLLING DAY .806 
NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN HELPERS ON POLLING DAY .795 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
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Calculation of the E-Campaigning Index 
The variables are as per those listed under E-Campaigning in the calculation of the 
overall Campaign Index 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - OPERATING AND MAINTAINING A WEBSITE .715 
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN - USING SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES .762 
CONTACT VOTERS IN THE CONSTITUENCY BY TEXT MESSAGE .364 
MAKE USE OF TWITTER TO COMMUNICATE WITH VOTERS .520 
CAMPAIGN EFFORT - MAINTAINING WEBSITE .748 
CAMPAIGN EFFORT - EMAILING VOTERS .617 
CAMPAIGN EFFORT - SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES (FACEBOOK) .800 
CAMPAIGN EFFORT - VIDEO/IMAGE SHARING SITES (YOUTUBE/FLICKR) .559 
MEANECAMP  .660 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
